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ABSTRACT
Vulnerability databases are vital sources of information on emergent
software security concerns. Security professionals, from system
administrators to developers to researchers, heavily depend on
these databases to track vulnerabilities and analyze security trends.
How reliable and accurate are these databases though?
In this paper, we explore this question with the National Vulner-
ability Database (NVD), the U.S. government’s repository of vulner-
ability information that arguably serves as the industry standard.
Through a systematic investigation, we uncover inconsistent or
incomplete data in the NVD that can impact its practical uses, affect-
ing information such as the vulnerability publication dates, names
of vendors and products affected, vulnerability severity scores, and
vulnerability type categorizations. We explore the extent of these
discrepancies and identify methods for automated corrections. Fi-
nally, we demonstrate the impact that these data issues can pose
by comparing analyses using the original and our rectified ver-
sions of the NVD. Ultimately, our investigation of the NVD not
only produces an improved source of vulnerability information,
but also provides important insights and guidance for the security
community on the curation and use of such data sources.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Securing computer systems in practice entails identifying, under-
standing, and remediating the stream of software security concerns
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that are continuously uncovered. To effectively do so, security pro-
fessionals and researchers depend on various sources of information
to inform them of new security issues. One vital source is vulner-
ability databases, which operate as a repository of vulnerability
information. However, is the information actually reliable?
In this work, we explore this question by identifying the limita-
tions of existing vulnerability datasets and their implications on real-
world security operations. While several vulnerability databases
exist, we focus on the one that is arguably the most widely used: the
National Vulnerability Database (NVD). This database, maintained
by the US government, strives to accurately document all publicly
known vulnerabilities, and effectively serves as the industry’s stan-
dard. Both commercial security services (e.g., Hakiri [12], Snyk [18],
and SourceClear [17]), and open-source security tools (e.g., Bundler-
audit [11], OWASP OSSIndex [16], and Dependency-check [13])
depend on the NVD’s vulnerability information to function effec-
tively. Furthermore, researchers [2, 3, 27] have used the NVD as a
core data source to shed light on aspects of the vulnerability dis-
covery and remediation process. Given the importance of the NVD,
it is crucial that we understand the quality of its data, lest some
incorrect information leads to a critical security lapse [5].
The prior work [19, 27, 28, 30] has investigated certain types of
data quality concerns in NVD. However, to the best of our knowl-
edge, there has not been a systematic and comprehensive analysis
of inconsistencies and incomplete data in the NVD to date. To close
this gap, in this paper, we perform an in-depth large-scale analysis
of the NVD, systematically evaluating each data field it contains. In
particular, we identify significant data issues with the vulnerabil-
ity publication date, affected vendor and product names, severity
scores, and vulnerability type. We quantify the scope of each is-
sue within the NVD, providing an understanding of each issue’s
ramifications. Then, we develop accurate and automated methods
of correcting the information, thus producing an improved and
more reliable NVD dataset for the security community to use. We
will be open-sourcing the tools we created for correcting the NVD
data quality concerns, as well as the rectified dataset itself. Finally,
we perform several analysis case studies using our improved NVD.
Beyond providing more reliable analysis results for core questions
on vulnerability discovery, disclosure, and remediation, our case
studies demonstrate how analysis conclusions and practical impli-
cations can greatly differ due to data quality issues. Ultimately, this
work will not only directly impact real-world security through an
improved dataset used in practice, but highlight common pitfalls
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that can affect other sources of vulnerability information, providing
lessons for improving them as well as their effective uses.
Applications and Implications. We show the pitfalls of using
NVD by highlighting NVD’s various inconsistencies and propose
methods to fix them. Overall, the study can be utilized by the NVD
towards the following end goals: (1) The estimated disclosure date
identification can enrich the vulnerability report for the end-user’s
perusal. (2) The vendor and product inconsistency finding tool can
be leveraged during the vulnerability reporting process to suggest
suitable vendor and product names to analysts. Moreover, the ob-
servations from our analyses and measurements can used as a best
practice when adding new vendors and product names in NVD.
(3) The deep learning-based CVSS v3 prediction engine can be
leveraged by NVD and security analysts alike for uniform severity
metric generation across the vulnerabilities in the database.
Contributions. (1) Through an extensive data-driven approach
backed byweb scraping,manual investigation, andmachine learning-
based automation, we assess the quality of NVD, identifying con-
cerns affecting each vulnerability data field. (2)We identify methods
to automatically remedy the data quality issues in NVD, providing
a more reliable source of vulnerability information. (3) As case
studies, we conduct several large-scale analyses of vulnerabilities,
providing the most accurate findings to several basic but core ques-
tions on vulnerability discovery, disclosure, and remediation. (4)
We shared the results of this work with the US National Institute of
Standards and Technology, which maintains the NVD. Following
that, NVD’s schemas have been updated to remove the free-form
vendor and product names that we identify as oft problematic [31].
Organization.We provide a review of the literature in section 2,
followed by an overview of the dataset in section 3. In section 4, we
present our main study, followed by case study analyses in section 5,
and a discussion in section 6. We conclude our work in section 7.
2 RELATEDWORK
Reliability of NVD. Quality issues in vulnerability databases, e.g.,
NVD, have been previously noted and studied. Nguyen and Mas-
saci [30] pointed out that the affected product versions in the NVD
are often incorrect, observing that roughly 25% of Google Chrome
CVEs had an incorrect Chrome version string. Christey and Mar-
tin [6] similarly explored issues in the NVD data and suggested
reporting biases as a root cause. Attila et al. [3] showed that CVSS
metrics are more suitable for enterprise software products than per-
sonal ones. Dong et al. [19] analyzed the inconsistencies in public
security vulnerability reports, including the NVD, and found over-
claims and underclaims in the affected software product versions.
While these studies call attention to certain inconsistencies, our
study stands out by providing a comprehensive and systematic in-
vestigation of incompleteness and inconsistencies across the NVD
data fields. In addition to identifying and quantifying the data qual-
ity issues therein, we also develop methods for correcting them.
Vulnerability Analysis. Our work provides vulnerability analy-
ses usingmore consistent vulnerability information, thus expanding
on the literature on vulnerability dynamics.
Previously, Shahzad et al. [39] analyzed the vulnerability life
cycle, and pointed out that remotely exploitable vulnerabilities rep-
resent 80% of all of them. Earlier, Clark et al. [7] outlined a relation
between a product’s familiarity and its first vulnerability disclosure:
a shorter time between product release and first vulnerability dis-
covery is shown for familiar products. Ozment and Schechter [36]
observed that 62% of vulnerabilities in the OpenBSD system were
foundational and took 2.5 years for them to be reported.
Stock et al. [41] and Li et al. [26] studied the vulnerability notifi-
cation channels and their significance. Zhao et al. [49] empirically
studied data from two web vulnerability discovery ecosystems for
trend analyses. Trinh et al. [44] studied vulnerabilities in web ap-
plications. Saha [38] extended an attack graph-based vulnerability
analysis framework to include complex security policies for effi-
cient vulnerability analysis. Zhang et al. [48] used data from NVD
to predict the time to next vulnerability, and argued that NVD
provides poor predictions while pointing out inconsistencies, e.g.,
missing version information, release time, and other obvious errors.
Votipka et al. [45] suggested integrating hackers and improved se-
curity training for testers in the vulnerability discovery. Xiao et
al. [47] detected vulnerability exploitation at a 90% rate. Sabottke et
al. [37] proposed a Twitter-based detector to identify vulnerabilities
likely to be exploited. Homaei and Shahriari [24] analyzed vulner-
ability reports between 2008 and 2014 and observed that security
professionals can prevent 60% of them by focusing on only seven
vulnerability categories. William et al. [46] proposed a framework
to discover evolutionary patterns in the vulnerabilities.
3 DATASET
We study the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) [33], the U.S.
government’s repository of public vulnerability information, ac-
tively maintained by the National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology (NIST). While there are other databases, we focused on the
NVD because it is widely used (in part because it is public and
free), and arguably serves as the industry standard for tracking
vulnerabilities. Nonetheless, our exploration of the NVD can pro-
vide insights into using other vulnerability databases. For the NVD,
reported vulnerabilities are analyzed and added in a standardized
format. Specifically, NVD entries contain the following. (1) A Com-
mon Vulnerability Exposure (CVE) ID number [8] that uniquely
identifies the vulnerability. (2) The vulnerability entry’s publication
date. (3) The vulnerability type/category, as classified by the Com-
mon Weakness Enumeration (CWE) [29]. (4) The severity, as rated
by the Common Vulnerability Severity Score (CVSS) [34]. Note that
there are two CVSS versions, the historical CVSS v2 (v2) and the
modern CVSS v3 (v3) [20], both on a scale from 0 to 10. Table 1
shows the CVSS severity level thresholds. Note that the v3 intro-
duces a critical level of severity. (5) A list of vendors and products
affected, as classified under the Common Platform Enumeration
(CPE) [35]. (6) Free-form vulnerability descriptions. There can be
multiple descriptions, although the typical one explains the secu-
rity concern. Another common description is a comment by the
CVE entry evaluator. (7) Optionally, reference URLs (e.g., security
advisories) are sometimes listed, providing vulnerability details.
NVD Scale.We use a snapshot of NVD captured on May 21, 2018.
This snapshot includes 107.2KCVEs added toNVDover two decades
(1998–2018). These vulnerabilities are categorized into 453 CWE
types, affecting 18.9K vendors and 46.6K products. We observe that
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Table 1: Score thresholds of v2 & v3 CVSS severity levels.
Label Abbreviation v2 v3
None – – 0.0
Low (L) 0.0–3.9 0.1–3.9
Medium (M) 4.0–6.9 4.0–6.9
High (H) 7.0–10.0 7.0–8.9
Critical (C) – 9.0–10.0
37.5K recent CVEs have the modern v3 severity label, in addition
to v2 labels, while the remaining CVEs only have v2 labels.
4 INCONSISTENCIES AND IMPROVEMENTS
The quality of data in a vulnerability database can heavily impact
vulnerability tracking and trend analyses. Prior work by Mu et
al. [28] already identified that crowd-sourcing vulnerability infor-
mation has limitations. In this section, we analyzed the NVD CVE
entries for inconsistencies and explored methods for rectifying
them. We focused on assessing the standardized non-free-form
fields, specifically the vulnerability’s publication date, CWE class,
CVSS rating, and the affected CPE. The remaining NVD fields (the
vulnerability description and reference URLs) are free-form with-
out a standardized structure, making it challenging to conceptually
define and identify inconsistencies, which we leave for future inves-
tigation. Note that we focused on data consistency issues, not data
error problems. We assumed that the data in the NVD is correct but
perhaps represented inconsistently, such that one could identify
the correct information without resorting to investigation beyond
what is provided through the NVD.
4.1 Publication Dates
Incompleteness. Vulnerability analysis often depends on tracking
when vulnerabilities became public. For example, security analysts
must consider how long a vulnerability has been public when prior-
itizing patching, calculating windows of exposure, or investigating
incidents (such as in log analysis). NVD records have a publication
date, but this date only indicates when the entry was added to the
database. We observed cases where the NVD publication date does
not give a clear picture of vulnerability. For example, CVE-2011-
0700 is a WordPress XSS vulnerability with an NVD publication
date of March 14, 2011. However, the CVE entry includes a refer-
ence URL for a public security advisory disclosing the vulnerability
over a month earlier on February 7, 2011.
Identification and Improvement.We attempted to identify dis-
closure dates by leveraging the reference URLs. Li and Paxson [27]
and Anwar et al. [2] previously suggested approximating the dis-
closure date by mining these references, as many are web pages
about the vulnerability and its publication date.
We first extracted the domains from the URL references, finding
that the 591.4K URLs in our data corresponded to 5,997 domains.
We focused on the top 50 domains, covering more than 85% of all
URLs (we observed diminishing returns from considering additional
domains). These top domains fall into three high-level categories:
(1) other vulnerability databases (e.g., SecurtiyFocus), (2) bug reports
or email archives threads (e.g., Bugzilla), and (3) security advisories
(e.g., cisco.com). Note that some domains are not in English (e.g.,
jvn.jp is in Japanese). Each of the webpages may have a different
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Figure 1: CDF of vulnerability lag times. Lag time is the number
of days after our estimated disclosure date when a vulnerability
enters into the NVD. Note, ≈38% of the vulnerabilities have no lag.
structure. Thus, we built a separate crawler for each domain to ex-
tract the relevant publication date for the vulnerability information
(if any). We note that 14 domains are no longer responsive (e.g.,
osvdb.org shut down in 2016). For a given CVE, we approximated
its public disclosure date as the minimum of the dates extracted
from the reference URLs or the NVD publication date.
Improvement Impact. We evaluated how many days the CVE
published date preceded our estimated disclosure date, which we
call the lag time. Figure 1 plots the percentage of CVEs within
a lag time. Notice that ≈38% of the vulnerabilities have a lag of
zero days. The growth of vulnerabilities by lag time slows after
accounting for the vulnerabilities with a lag of ≤ 6 days (≈70%). We
observed that ≈ 28% of the vulnerabilities have a lag of more than
a week. Moreover, we distributed the lag among the v2 labels and
observed that we improved on the publication date for only 37%
of low severity vulnerabilities, in comparison to 41% medium and
65% high severity vulnerabilities. This observation is particularly
interesting as vulnerability tracking and analysis of high severity
vulnerabilities are likely most valuable and can be most affected by
this inconsistency.
4.2 Vendor and Product Names
Inconsistencies. Practitioners depend on lists of vendors and prod-
ucts affected by a CVE to identify vulnerabilities affecting software
they use [40], or to monitor the security trends of various software
systems. We observed inconsistencies in these vendor and prod-
uct names. For example, BEA Systems (vendor) is labeled as both
bea (171 associated CVEs) and bea_systems (14 different associated
CVEs). Similarly, we observedAVG’s anti-virus product hasmultiple
names, including antivirus and anti-virus. Thus, those monitoring
for vulnerabilities by vendor or product names will obtain incorrect
results unless carefully accounting for these inconsistencies.
Product Version Inconsistency. The NVD is also subject to in-
consistent product versions, as demonstrated by Nguyen and Mas-
saci [30]. Dong et al. [19] leveraged NLPmethods to find and correct
inconsistencies in product versions through mining the NVD refer-
ence URLs. Thus, we did not investigate product versions further.
Identification and Improvement. Initially, we lack a general
understanding of the nature of the vendor and product name in-
consistencies. Thus, we resorted to manually analyzing name pairs
to determine if both names represent the same entity (which we
will call matching pairs). However, the manual analysis does not
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Table 2: Common inconsistency patterns in vendor naming.
Category Tokens Length(Longest Substring Match)≥ 3 Length(Longest Substring Match)<3#MP = 0 #MP = 1 #MP > 1 Pref PaV #MP = 0 #MP = 1 #MP > 1 Pref PaV
Possible 260 (524) 78 (155) 319 (608) 6 (11) 293 (566) 5 (10) 223 (381) 658 (1151) 18 (33) 2 (4) 2 (4)
Confirmed 260 (524) 52 (103) 295 (561) 4 (7) 266 (513) 3 (6) 53 (76) 201 (341) 11 (20) 2 (4) 2 (4)
1 The numbers outside the parentheses are unique vendor pairs, while the numbers inside are the names associated with them.
2 Considered inconsistency patterns: (1) identical names except for special characters (labeled as Tokens); (2) vendor names associated with identical
product names (labeled as #MP=X, where X is the number of matching product names), (3) one vendor name is a product of the other vendor name
in the pair (labeled as PaV), and (4) one name is a string prefix of the other name (labeled as Pref).
3 For cases (2)–(4), the longest common substring (LCS) between names is used as a signifier ( |LCS | ≥ 3 v. |LCS |< 3).
4 Pairs with (#MP=0 ∧ |LCS |= 0 ∧ not Pref) are not included in this table, as they do not meet our vendor matching heuristics.
Table 3: Vendor and product name inconsistencies in NVD, Securi-
tyFocus (SF), and SecurityTracker (ST).
Database Vendor Product# #imp. #con. # #imp. #ven.
NVD 18,991 1,835 871 46,685 3,101 700
SF 24,760 2,094 878 - - -
ST 4,151 110 53 - - -
1 For both vendors and products, we list the number (#) of distinct names
and # impacted by a discrepancy (#imp). 2 For vendors, we list the number
of consistent vendor names that map to inconsistent vendor names (#con).
3 For products, we list the number of vendors affected by inconsistent
product names. We only investigated produce names for the NVD.
scale to the number of unique name pairs. To reduce the scale to a
manageable level, we used heuristics to filter pairs down to those
that are likely matching (i.e., related to the same entity yet with
inconsistent names). We recognized that these heuristics should
provide broad coverage but may not be truly comprehensive.
Vendor Names. Informed by manual exploration, we developed
three heuristics to identify likely matching vendor name pairs.
• Vendor name pairs share characters in common. This ac-
counts for various scenarios such as where one name is
misspelled (e.g., microsoft and microsft), represented in a
different format (e.g., avast and avast!), abbreviated (e.g.,
lan_management_system and lms), or a strict substring of
another (e.g., lynx and lynx_project).
• A product name is used as a vendor name (e.g., microsoft
and windows both appearing as vendors).
• Vendor pairs share the same product name.
We filtered out vendor name pairs that do not satisfy any of
these heuristics, and manually investigated each remaining pair
by researching their products, developers, and associated organi-
zations. For each group of matching name pairs that represent the
same vendor, we created a mapping of vendor names to consoli-
date those representing the same vendor under a consistent name.
Note that there may be multiple matching pairs associated with the
same vendor, indicating multiple inconsistent names. For the names
associated with a vendor, we considered the one with the most as-
sociated CVEs as the consistent name, and remapped inconsistent
vendor names in the NVD using our mapping.
To shed light on common patterns in inconsistent vendor nam-
ing, in Table 2, we listed those common patterns, as well as how
likely those patterns signals a matching pair. We observed that 260
name pairs were identical except for the inclusion of special char-
acters (e.g., ! or _), and all were matching vendor name pairs. For
other name pairs, when the longest substring match was at least 3
characters, the majority (at least 60%) of name pairs were matching
under the other patterns. Notably, when the two vendor names in
the pair were both associated with the same product name, or when
one vendor name was a string prefix of the other, the pair were
matched in over 90% of cases. When the longest substring match
was less than 3 characters, only a minority of name pairs were still
matching under the different patterns.
Product Names. After consolidating vendor names (above), we
identified likely matching product names under the same (consoli-
dated) vendor using two heuristics, and then manually evaluated
the pairs. For the first heuristic, we tokenized product names by
splitting by white spaces and special characters, and considered a
product name pair as likely matching if the two tokenized names
are identical. This captures cases such as internet-explorer, inter-
net_explorer, and internet explorer. For the second heuristic, if one
product name in the pair is tokenized into multiple components and
the other is a single component, we concatenated the first charac-
ter of the multi-component name, and compared the concatenated
string with the other product name. This captures abbreviations,
such as with internet-explorer and ie. Next, we investigated replac-
ing, adding, and swapping of characters. We did so by determining
the edit distance between product pairs. This is followed by manual
verification of the pairs. The product names varying by charac-
ters can be different products altogether, e.g., cisco’s ucs-e160dp-
m1_firmware and ucs-e140dp-m1_firmware have an edit distance
of one, but are different products. With our analysis, we focused
on pairs that can be a result of human error, e.g., nativesolutions’s
tbe_banner_engine and the_banner_engine. As with vendor names,
we mapped inconsistent product names to a consistent name based
on the name associated with the most CVEs, and remapped product
names in the NVD based on this mapping. Table 3 depicts that we
found over 3K products inconsistently named affecting 700 vendors.
We note these two heuristics are more limited than those consid-
ered for vendor names, as we found that product names are often
quite similar without representing the same product. For example,
we explored using substring matching heuristics (as with vendor
names), but found the number of pairs flagged for analysis to be
too large and with many false positives (i.e., non-matching pairs).
Improvement Impact. Table 3 lists the extent of the vendor and
product naming inconsistencies we identified. The NVD includes
≈19K distinct vendors, and about 10% of them were impacted by
vendor naming inconsistencies. These ≈1.8K vendor names could
be consolidated under 871 vendor names, thus removing ≈5% of
distinct vendors. Inconsistencies similarly affected 6% of distinct
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Table 4: Transformation from v2 to v3 in numbers.
HHHHHv2
v3 L M H C
# % # % # % # %
L 363 9.53 3,211 84.30 235 6.17 0 0.00
M 242 1.07 10,589 46.88 11,136 49.30 621 2.75
H 0 0.00 549 4.96 5,293 47.80 5,232 47.24
NVD product names, and consolidating names would reduce the
number of product names also by about 5%. Thus, inconsistencies
affect a non-trivial fraction of vendors and products. These num-
bers are lower bounds on the extent of vendor and product name
inconsistencies in the NVD, since our identification and correction
method relied on heuristics that may not be all-encompassing.
We also explored vendor naming inconsistencies in two other
vulnerability databases with this information, SecurityTracker [14],
and SecurityFocus [15]. We used the same vendor name mapping
that we generated (above) for correcting to consistent names, and
applied it to the vendor strings in these two databases. As a result,
we found as shown in Table 3 that 3% and 8% of vendor names
were inconsistent for SecurityTracker and SecurityFocus, respec-
tively. Exploration of these databases specifically will likely yield
further inconsistencies, highlighting that this data quality issue is
prominent in vulnerability database generally, and our approach
for rectifying the NVD could be used for our datasets as well.
We note that Dong et al. [19] also investigated product names
specifically, where their heuristic was to split product names by
white spaces into words, and label two products as matching if they
shared words. In comparison, their method does not account for
abbreviations or special character separators, and yield false posi-
tives when different products share similar words (e.g., Microsoft’s
Internet Explorer and Internet Information Services products).
4.3 Severity Scores
Inconsistencies. NVD uses the CVSS standard for rating sever-
ity [34]. However, CVSS has had multiple versions, with the modern
v3 addressing limitations of prior versions. As v3 was only released
in 2015, only a third of the CVEs in our NVD dataset have v3 scores.
Security analysts monitoring vulnerabilities over time must either
rely on v2 and its limitations (e.g., inaccurate security ratings), or
evaluate a subset of the NVD data. Vulnerabilities pre-dating the
release of v2 are still relevant, as age-old vulnerabilities are often
still used in active attacks. For example, CVE-2011-0997 (a DHCP
client vulnerability) was disclosed in 2011 yet could be used to
target Avaya desk and IP conference phones in 2019 [4]. Similarly,
CVE-2004-0113 is a medium severity vulnerability under v2 that
was actively exploited in 2018 (over 14 years after disclosure) to
exploit hosts and install crypto-mining malware [21]. Thus, we
would ideally be able to backport v3 scores throughout the NVD,
providing a more modern security rating for all vulnerabilities.
Identification and Improvement. Identifying CVEs with only v2
is straightforward, as NVD entries list the CVSS version associated
with a score. The challenge is then improving the NVD by auto-
matically assigning v3 scores to all CVEs. Both CVSS versions are
calculated from a weighted aggregation of an input set of feature
values, with v3 providing additional features and refined weight-
ing. Thus, our approach is to develop a machine learning model
that inputs v2 features, as well as other CVE entry information,
and outputs meaningful v3 scores (despite lacking explicit features
that normally are input into the v3 calculations). To evaluate the
accuracy, we aimed not to necessarily produce identical severity
scores as v3 would output, but predict the correct severity category
(low, medium, high, critical) as the v3 score, which is commonly
used for vulnerability prioritization [34]. We specifically applied
a machine and deep learning approaches to model the potentially
complex weighting and interactions between different features.
Features.While most parameters required for the severity scores
remain the same as in v2, the parameters in v3 capture an annotated
impact by the vulnerability. For example, “access vector” in v2 was
transformed into “attack vector” in v3 with the specific effect of
vulnerability into Physical (P), Network (N), Adjacent (A), and Local
(L) impacts.Where v2 considered P attacks as L, v3 divides the scores
and introduces a new scope parameter, for vulnerabilities impacts
beyond the exploitable system. The access complexity in v2 was
divided into attack complexity and user interaction in v3, although
the influence of the temporal metric is decreased in v3. To this
end, we used the following v2 parameters as features to extrapolate
v3 scores: access vector and complexity, authentication, integrity,
availability, all privilege, user privilege, and other privilege flags.
Holm and Afridi [23] studied CVSS reliability by surveying 384
experts and 3,000 vulnerabilities, concluding the reliability depends
on the vulnerability type. Thus, we add CWE-ID to our features.
Ground Truth Dataset. For ground truth, we need a mapping
of v2 to v3 scores (or categories). As such, we used the recent
CVEs in the NVD with both CVSS versions (≈37K CVEs). We note
that changes in the v3 score emphasize a better expressiveness for
vulnerabilities’ impact. The effect of these changes on the vulner-
abilities is summarized in Table 4, with no significant change in
population, i.e., no vulnerability moves from Low in v2 to Critical
in v3 and no vulnerability moves from High in v2 to Low in v3.
Model’s Training. Using the aforementioned features, we pre-
dicted the v3 base scores for vulnerabilities that do not have the
v3 metrics. We began by splitting the ground truth data into 80%
training and 20% testing datasets evenly distributed among classes.
Additionally, we observe non-linear patterns among the v2 and v3
relation (see A.1 for details). We then applied a range of machine
and deep learning prediction algorithms to predict the v3 scores:
(1) Linear Regression (LR), (2) Support Vector Regression (SVR),
(3) Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN), and (4) Deep Neural
Networks (DNN). Linear regression finds the linear relationship
between a target and one or more features. In addition, we used
Support Vector Machine (SVM) as a regression method to predict v3
base score; we conducted the prediction using various combinations
of parameters and report the best performing model (kernel type
= rbf (radial basis function), kernel coefficient = 0.1, and penalty
parameter = 2). We leveraged different deep learning techniques
to extract deep feature representations for the vulnerabilities. We
implemented a CNN model consisting of four consecutive convo-
lutional layers. The first two layers consist of 64 filters and the
remaining layers consist of 128 filters with a filter size of 3 × 3. The
convolutional layers are followed by a flattening operation and a
fully connected layer with 512 neurons. Next, a single neuron with
a sigmoid activation function is used to output the prediction of the
model. The sigmoid activation function is defined as f (x ) = 11+e−x .
Similarly, we implemented a DNN model consisting of four fully
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Table 5: Prediction results: Average error (AE) and AE Rate (AER).
Algorithm LR SVR CNN DNN
AER (%) 12.16 12.63 9.62 11.61
AE 0.73 0.82 0.54 0.65
connected layers with size of 128, 128, 256, and 256, respectively.
The fully connected layers are followed by a single neuron with a
sigmoid activation function to output the prediction of the model.
We trained the deep learning models over 100 epochs using mean
squared error loss function, 1N
∑N
i=0(y(xi ) − f (xi ))2, and Adam op-
timizer with a learning rate of 0.001. For evaluation, we defined
the average error (AE) as [∑Ni=0Abs(y(xi ) − f (xi ))]/N , where xi is
the ith sample of the testing dataset, y(∗) is the v3 severity score of
the sample, f (∗) is the predicted value of v3 severity score of the
sample, and N is the size of the testing dataset. Similarly, we defined
the average error rate (AER) as [∑Ni=0Abs(y(xi ) − f (xi ))/y(xi )]/N .
Model Learning Results. Table 5 shows the average error and
error deviation for different machine learning algorithms. The table
shows that CNN has the lowest error rate and average error. Table 7
shows the overall accuracy of our prediction engine. The overall
accuracy of 86.29% means that our model cannot predict the v3
scores correctly for 13.71% of the vulnerabilities. These 13.71%
vulnerabilities were not correctly characterized by the v2 but are
correctly characterized by v3. Moreover, we translated the v3 base
scores to their respective severity labels according to the ranges in
Table 1. Table 7 lists the accuracy per input class, and we found that
the model performs best for the input class High, i.e., with 93.55%
accuracy, and performs worst for target class Low, i.e., with 82.84%
accuracy. However, we also observed that DNN performs slightly
better than CNN for the input class Low. Furthermore, we also tried
other machine learning algorithms, and found that deep learning-
based models (CNN and DNN) outperformed those alternatives.
Given that the CNN-based model outperforms DNN-based model
by ≈2%, overall, we chose the CNN-based model for prediction.
Improvement Impact.With our model, we can assign v3 scores
and severity levels to all vulnerabilities in the NVD. For over 74K
CVEs with only v2 scores, Table 6 depicts their severity categories
under v2 and our predicted v3. We observed that 48K CVEs change
severity levels under v3, with 29K CVEs changing severity cate-
gories if we consider v2 High and v3 Critical to be equivalent (as
v2 lacks a Critical level). Thus, nearly 40% of CVEs have different
severity once the severity score is updated to v3. Overall, the change
skews towards high severity ratings. We hypothesized this is be-
cause v3 was designed in part to account for the scope of software
affected, which can elevate the severity of a vulnerability when
other sensitive systems are involved beyond the system immedi-
ately vulnerable. As a result, users of the NVD can prioritize better
the vulnerabilities that they analyze and address.
The most impacted vulnerabilities by v3 do not adhere to any
patterns, as confirmed from the prediction results, highlighting the
power of our learning techniques in capturing complex mappings
(see Appendix A.1 for detailed analysis). Note that both old vulner-
abilities mentioned earlier that are still exploited are more properly
categorized as critical severity under our model (whereas one was
medium severity and the other was high severity, with v2 labels).
Johnson et al. [25] assessed the credibility of CVSS scoring using
a Bayesian method and found that, except for a few dimensions,
Table 6: The v2 and v3, where v3 labels are predicted by our model.
HHHHHv2
v3 L M H C
# % # % # % # %
L 183 3.42 5,160 96.43 8 0.15 0 0.00
M 1 0.00 15,272 39.79 23,107 60.21 0 0.00
H 0 0.00 490 1.64 10,135 33.89 19,281 64.47
Table 7: Prediction accuracy. The overall accuracy of our prediction
engine, and its accuracy by input class.
Accuracy Overall By input (v2) class (%)(%) L M H
LR 83.14 82.58 79.31 91.14
SVR 66.46 82.97 71.15 51.21
CNN 86.29 82.84 83.31 93.55
DNN 84.41 83.10 80.67 92.48
CVSS is reliable. By analyzing five databases, they argued that NVD
is the most reliable with respect to CVSS quality. In conducting our
v3 extrapolation, we also argued that the predicted labels will help
users prioritize vulnerabilities better. In particular, we found that
the confidentiality, base score, and integrity are important features
that impact the performance of our prediction model, i.e., the degree
of information disclosure, the cumulative score of the vulnerability,
and the degree of impact on the integrity of the victim.
Allodi et al. [1] evaluated information affecting severity assess-
ment. Our work extends their findings by showing which features
determine the CVSS severity v3 score of a vulnerability.
4.4 Vulnerability Types
Inconsistencies. In the NVD, a CVE should be assigned a vulnera-
bility type under the CWE classification [29] to provide users with
an overview of the vulnerability nature and risk. Security analysts
and developers leverage the vulnerability type to understand attack
vectors that may impact their software, types of defenses to deploy,
and track shifts in security concerns over time [9]. However, we
identified that the CWE field for CVEs is not consistently populated
correctly with a CWE-ID value.
We found CVEs without CWE values, as well as those with their
CWE entry as NVD-CWE-Other. By itself, this is missing data—
rather than inconsistent, and out of the scope of our investiga-
tion (although worth noting for those analyzing NVD vulnerability
types). However, we observed that the free-form CVE description
(particularly the description provided by one of the vulnerabil-
ity’s evaluators) often contains the CWE-ID. For example, CVE-
2007-0838 lists NVD-CWE-Other as its CWE-ID, while its evaluator
description includes “CWE-835: Loop with Unreachable Exit Condi-
tion (’Infinite Loop’)”. We also observed CVEs that list additionally
relevant CWE-IDs in the description beyond those listed in the
CWE field. In these cases, the CWE information is accessible in the
CVE entry, but inconsistently provided.
Identification and Improvement. The CWE-ID follows a stan-
dard and distinct format that allows us to easily identify IDs in
description strings through a regular expression (i.e., CWE-[0-9]*).
For all CVEs, we applied this regular expression to the description
strings to extract any CWE-IDs and add them to the set of CWE-IDs
listed in the CWE field, if any. From this set of CWE-IDs, we filtered
any CWE-ID values that indicate missing or non-specific CWEs
(e.g., NVD-CWE-Other). In theory, descriptions could list CWE-IDs
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that are not relevant to the CVE (e.g., if discussing another vulnera-
bility). However, through manually inspecting a random sample,
we did not observe any erroneous cases where the CWE-ID in the
description is not correct. Evidently, the CVE description outlines
the traces of a vulnerability, which can be used to determine the
type of vulnerability. We, therefore, investigated the capability of
the CVE descriptions to extrapolate their corresponding types. We
did so by utilizing different Natural Language Processing, machine
learning, and deep learning techniques.
The crowd-sourced nature of the vulnerabilities devoid the de-
scriptions of a standard descriptive pattern. Therefore, we began by
preprocessing the data. Particularly, we unified the cases (convert
text to lower case), removed the stop words and special charac-
ters (commonly used words that do not affect the meaning of the
sentence, e.g., This capability can be accessed is changed to capa-
bility access), replaced contractions (e.g., identifier’s is changed to
identifier), and tense (past tense is changed to present tense, e.g.,
used is changed to use). Then, Universal Sentence Encoder [22], a
pre-trained transformer that is used to transform the text into high
dimensional vector representation depending upon the semantic
similarities and clustering, is utilized to represent the descriptions
as vectors of size 1 × 512. The encoded vectors are then used to
train and evaluate several machine learning and deep learning tech-
niques, namely, k-Nearest Neighbor (k-NN), CNN, and DNN. We
observed that k-NN (k = 1) provides the best results, predicting 151
different types with 65.60% accuracy. While the results seem high
considering the number of target classes, they cannot be reliably
used given the criticality of the application.
Improvement Impact. By applying our CWE-ID extraction from
CVE descriptions and matching CWE-ID name from the CWE list
from their website [10], we correct the CWE field for 2,456 vulner-
abilities that do not have their types labeled. These vulnerabilities
also include those that already have types assigned. Statistically,
the existing database includes 26,312 vulnerabilities with NVD-
CWE-Other label, 7,566 with NVD-CWE-noinfo label, and 1,293
with no assigned label, aggregating to ≈31% of all the vulnerabili-
ties. Additionally, we observed that most of the affected CVEs after
our inconsistency fixes are those of type NVD-CWE-Others. Our
analysis finds appropriate labels for 1,732 of the NVD-CWE-Other
vulnerabilities and 14 of both the NVD-CWE-noinfo and unassigned
vulnerabilities, making up for ≈5% of those vulnerabilities.
5 CASE STUDIES
With an improved and more consistent NVD, we conduct several
vulnerability analyses as case studies on the impact of our NVD
corrections. For each analysis, we describe what questions are being
asked, how the answers might be valuable in practice, the results
from the analysis using both the original and rectified NVD data,
and the impact of our improvements on the analysis outcome.
We recognize that there are a variety of potential analysis di-
rections. This subset is by no means comprehensive, but rather
involves informative questions one might reasonably ask when us-
ing the CVE fields we investigated from the NVD. While we believe
the results of our analysis are useful for the security community, the
ultimate goal of these case studies is to demonstrate how analysis
results can be affected by the NVD data issues that we correct.
Table 8: Top 10 dates with the most vulnerabilities by CVE publica-
tion and our estimated disclosure dates (EDD). Day of week (DoW)
and percent of that year’s vulnerabilities reported on date are used.
CVE Date DoW Vulns EDD DoW Vulns# % # %
12/31/04 F 1,098 44.8 09/09/14 T 384 5.1
05/02/05 M 816 16.6 07/09/18 M 359 2.4
12/31/02 T 441 20.5 04/02/18 M 344 2.3
12/31/03 W 407 26.7 07/05/17 W 313 2.4
07/09/18 M 423 2.8 01/19/16 T 295 4.6
12/31/05 Sa 384 7.8 07/18/17 T 275 2.2
02/15/18 Th 340 2.3 07/14/15 T 268 3.7
09/09/14 T 326 4.1 05/02/05 M 256 5.4
08/08/17 T 316 2.2 01/17/17 T 251 2.0
04/18/18 W 281 1.9 07/17/18 T 245 1.7
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Figure 2: The number of CVEs disclosed per day of the week (using
our estimated disclosure dates) and published to the NVD.
5.1 Vulnerability Disclosures
Question.When are vulnerabilities most frequently disclosed?
Analysis Value: Understanding the times associated with high
levels of vulnerability disclosures could shed light on underlying
decisions in the disclosure process, as well as the impact of those
decisions. For example, hypothetically, vendors could opt to dis-
close vulnerabilities at the end of the week or near holidays. As
many people (including those working for media organizations)
are off of work during subsequent periods, the vulnerabilities may
draw less negative attention. As a consequence though, vulnera-
bility remediation may be substantially delayed. It is important to
understand if this indeed happens frequently.
Analysis Results: Table 8 shows the top 10 dates in terms of
the number of vulnerability disclosures (based on our estimated
disclosure date), as well as the day of the week for each date. When
considering US holidays, we do not notice any particular pattern of
pre-holiday disclosures. Rather, several of these top dates are within
a couple of weeks after a US holiday, such as Independence Day
(7/9/18, 7/5/17, 7/18/17, 7/14/15, and 7/17/18), Labor Day (9/9/14),
and New Year’s Day (1/17/17 and 1/19/16). Additionally, we note
that these dates are primarily on Mondays and Tuesdays. To inves-
tigate this observation more broadly, Figure 2 shows the number
of vulnerabilities disclosed on each day of the week. We find that
beyond the top 10 dates, vulnerabilities are most frequently dis-
closed in the first half of a week (with fewer disclosures on Friday
or over the weekend). In this analysis, we consider US holidays as
most vendors in the NVD are US-based companies. However, we
recognize that other nations celebrate many other holidays, and
leave a more detailed global analysis for future work. We note that
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most vulnerabilities are disclosed during reasonable periods, where
security professionals can obtain and act on information promptly.
Impact of NVD Data Issues: For top CVE publication dates
from Table 8, we observe New Year’s Eve as four of the top 10
most active days, whereas it does not appear anywhere among
the top 10 dates by our estimated disclosure dates. Most notably,
on 12/31/2004, over 1K CVEs were added to the NVD, accounting
for over 44% of CVEs for that year. Yet according to our estimated
disclosure date, only 175 were publicly disclosed that day. This
discrepancy suggests an NVD artifact where a large number of
CVEs may be added to the database before a new year arrives, or
backdated to the last day of a prior year, rather than a more fun-
damental aspect of vulnerability reporting. Using the raw NVD
data for vulnerability frequency analysis could produce inaccurate
conclusions such as high vulnerability reporting during holidays.
Similarly, Figure 2 indicates a more equal distribution of CVE publi-
cation dates throughout the week, which would incorrectly suggest
many CVEs are indeed disclosed near weekends.
5.2 Vulnerability Severity
Question.What is the severity distribution of vulnerabilities?
Analysis Value: As thousands of vulnerabilities are identified
annually, it is vital that security practitioners can prioritize the
most severe ones first. Furthermore, understanding what fraction of
vulnerabilities receives each severity label allows them to identify
how many vulnerabilities they may need to contend with. For
the security community, it is also valuable to understand whether
disclosed vulnerabilities skew towards low or high severity ones,
shedding light on the nature of vulnerabilities being uncovered.
Analysis Results: Recall that in Section 4.3, we augmented the
NVD by automatically applying accurate v3 severity ratings to all
CVEs, rather than just relying on the most recent CVEs reported
since v3 became standard. In Table 9, we present the distribution of
CVE severity (across all CVEs in the NVD) for both v2 and our pre-
dicted v3. In total, 8.25% of all CVEs are low severity under v2, with
the majority as medium severity. In contrast, under our predicted
v3, less than 2% are low severity, and the severity distribution is
skewed towards the higher end, with the majority of vulnerabilities
as high or critical severity. From both the v2 and v3 distributions,
the small proportion of low severity vulnerabilities suggests some
bias against discovering, reporting, or disclosing less urgent secu-
rity concerns. However, v3’s skew towards high severity ratings
could spur different vulnerability remediation behavior, as many
vulnerabilities rated as medium under v2 but higher under v3 might
have been ignored by security practitioners earlier.
Figure 3 further breaks down the yearly distribution of CVEs
across different severity categories, for v2, v3, and our predicted
v3. Using our predicted v3 severity scores, we observe a decreasing
trend in the proportion of critical severity CVEs over the years. For
example, from 2011 onwards, less than 20% of each year’s CVEs
were critical, compared to the early 2000s where nearly 30-40%
were likewise. This change indicates that the severity distribution
of vulnerabilities is shifting over time. While we are uncertain of
the cause of this shift, one hypothesis is that the increasing use
of program analysis and fuzzing tools may be producing larger
vulnerability populations than before, but the number of critical
Table 9: CVSS severity score distributions over all CVEs.
Label v2 (%) Predicted v3 (%)
Low 8.25 1.62
Medium 54.83 38.30
High 36.92 44.48
Critical N.A. 15.60
ones remains similar, thus resulting in a smaller proportion. Future
work could investigate this phenomenon in more depth.
Table 10: Top 10 vulnerability types by the number of critical or
high severity CVEs using v2, v3, and our predicted v3 (pv3) scores.
v2 v3 pv3
High Critical High Critical High
Type # Type # Type # Type # Type #
BO1 6935 BO1 1221 BO1 3025 SQLI2 3420 BO1 4078
SQLI2 4115 SQLI2 673 PM3 1497 BO1 1783 PM3 2096
PM3 2581 IV4 323 IV4 1291 CI5 766 CR18 1802
IV4 2070 UaF7 271 AC11 955 PM3 601 IV4 1749
CI5 1463 AC11 247 IE14 683 IV4 447 RM6 1426
RM6 1416 PM3 232 IO15 680 PT9 364 IE14 1180
UaF7 712 IA10 190 CSRF16 671 AC11 362 PT9 1173
NE8 702 CD12 125 UaF7 443 RM6 341 CI5 1168
PT9 672 CMD13 114 BoR17 414 NE8 295 CSRF16 984
IA10 666 CI5 108 PT9 360 UaF7 224 NE8 777
1Buffer Overflow, 2SQL Injection, 3Permission Management, 4Input Validation, 5Code Injection,
6Resource Management, 7Use-after-Free, 8Numerical Error, 9Path Traversal,
10Improper Authorization, 11Access Control, 12Credentials, 13Command,
14Information Exposure, 15Integer Overflow, 16Cross-Site Request Forgery, 17Buffer Over Read.
Impact of NVD Data Issues: In NVD, all CVEs since 2017 are
assigned v3 scores. However, no CVE before 1999 has an assigned
v3 score, and before 2013, no more than 35 CVEs each year have a v3
score retroactively labeled (as v3 was officially released at the end
of 2015 [32]). This minority of CVEs with assigned v3 scores is too
limited for many analyses. For example, as seen in Figure 3, CVEs
with assigned v3 scores in certain years are unrepresentative of the
likely real severity distribution. In 2000-2002, 2004-2006, and 2009,
only one severity level appears for all CVEs with assigned v3 scores.
While security analysts could rely on v2 instead, v3 was explicitly
designed to overcome limitations of v2. Thus, our predicted v3
affords comprehensive severity analysis across the entire NVD
dataset. This historical perspective is particularly important as
vulnerabilities remain viable for years after disclosure [21].
5.3 Vulnerability Types
Question.Which vulnerability type has most critical vulnerabilities?
Analysis Value: Understanding which vulnerabilities are as-
sociated with the most critical CVEs is useful for both security
practitioners and researchers, allowing them to prioritize which
tools or defense systems to invest in or investigate.
Analysis Results: Our analysis involves the CWE and CVSS
severity fields. In table 10 we list the top 10 CWE categories by the
number of high/critical severity CWEs, using v2, v3, and pv3 sever-
ity scores. By both correcting CWE labels and using our predicted
v3 scores, we identify that SQL injection has the most critical CVEs,
with almost twice as many as the next vulnerability type (buffer
overflows). Meanwhile, for high-but-not-critical CVEs, buffer over-
flows are most common, and SQL injection does not appear within
the top 10. This suggests that when SQL injection vulnerabilities
are identified, they are typically of the utmost severity.
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Figure 3: CVEs Distribution across severity categories over the years with different severity scoring methods; v2, v3, and pv3 (our predicted
v3 scores applied to all CVEs in the NVD; §4.3). Recall that v3 was only released in 2015, and all CVEs after 2017 were labeled with v3 scores.
However, a subset of CVEs before 2017 was retroactively labeled with v3 scores.
Impact of NVDData Issues: Buffer overflow and SQL injection
are consistently the most frequent types under v2, v3, and our PV3.
However, we note that overall, the top 10 CWE types for our PV3
more closely resembles that of v2, compared to v3. For example,
access control, command injection, and hard-coded credentials are
in the top 10 v3 critical CVEs, but not in v2 or our PV3. Thus,
our corrected NVD results appear more consistent than using the
original CWE and v3 NVD labels.
5.4 Vendor and Product Names
Question.Which vendors have most CVEs or vulnerable products?
Analysis Value: Analysts may inform their operation using the
vulnerability impact information across vendors, e.g., which ven-
dors to track for new vulnerabilities, or which products to analyze.
Analysis Results: Table 11 shows the top 10 vendors per the
associated CVEs and affected products, as a count and a fraction of
all CVEs and affected products associated with each vendor. The
statistics are presented for before and after our NVD corrections,
but we will use the post-correction values for our analysis.
We observe that the top vendors represent a significant fraction
of all CVEs and products. The top 10 vendors account for about
36% of all CVEs and 22% of all products. Thus, the impact of CVE
vulnerabilities is concentrated on a small set of vendors, with a long-
tail of the remaining less-impact ones. It is also interesting to note
that the top vendors by CVE count are quite different than those by
the product count, with only 4 common vendors. This difference
suggests that the concentration of CVEs among top vendors is not
simply due to these vendors supporting a wide number of products.
Impact of NVDData Issues: The impact of product and vendor
name inconsistencies is less dramatic for this analysis, as ultimately
the order of top vendors remains the same before and after correc-
tions. However, the changes in vulnerability counts can be notable.
For example, Oracle had over 100 more associated CVEs after our
naming fixes, and Debian had 95 more CVEs.
Table 11: Top 10 vendors per the number of associated CVEs and
affected products, after and before name corrections (# is a count
and % as a percent of CVEs or products associated with that vendor).
Vendor
# of CVEs
After Before
# % # %
Microsoft 6,602 6.16 6,597 6.15
Oracle 5,650 5.27 5,526 5.15
Apple 4,574 4.26 4,574 4.26
IBM 4,160 3.88 4,160 3.88
Google 3,934 3.67 3,933 3.67
Cisco 3,674 3.43 3,674 3.43
Adobe 2,869 2.68 2,869 2.68
Linux 2,275 2.12 2,254 2.10
Debian 2,275 2.12 2,180 2.03
Redhat 2,161 2.01 2,144 2.00
Vendor
# of Products
After Before
# % # %
HP 3,067 6.73 3,083 6.60
Cisco 1,821 4.00 1,839 3.94
IBM 926 2.03 926 1.98
Axis 808 1.77 808 1.73
Intel 721 1.58 723 1.55
Huawei 701 1.54 707 1.51
Lenovo 579 1.27 579 1.24
Oracle 553 1.21 546 1.17
Siemens 510 1.12 534 1.14
Microsoft 489 1.07 486 1.04
Table 12: CVEs with mislabeled vendors/products by severity levels
using v2 labels and our predicted v3 (pv3) labels.
Mislabeled Vendor Mislabeled Product
v2 pv3 v2 pv3
Low 275 10 27 4
Medium 2,033 1,101 196 105
High 1,206 1,484 159 205
Critical NA 919 NA 68
Even when the number of CVEs with a mislabeled vendor or
product is small, the security risk can be high. In Table 12, we con-
sider all CVEs with the corrected vendor or product label, and break
down their severity levels using v2 and our predicted v3. While
only several thousand CVEs were mislabeled and subsequently
corrected, over a third are high severity under v2 and a quarter
are critical under our predicted v3. In total, nearly 1000 mislabeled
CVEs are critically severe. A security analyst tracking a particular
product or vendor could easily miss relevant severe vulnerabilities,
putting their systems at risk. (After all, it only takes one missed vul-
nerability to permit a security situation, such as with Equifax [42].)
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6 DISCUSSION
The Need for a Reliable Vulnerability Database. Given the wide
range of applications of vulnerability databases, in both the indus-
try and the research community, the reliability of the information
present in them is of the utmost importance. However, some of
the key takeaways of this work show that the information in NVD
is inconsistent, as demonstrated by the associated quantification,
thereby raising questions on NVD’s reliability. The inconsistencies
are shown to vary, including the delay between a vulnerability’s
disclosure and its publish date in the NVD, to its vendor and product
name, to its severity metrics, to the vulnerability type. With this
work, by identifying the inconsistencies, we highlight the pitfalls of
using NVD. Given the non-uniform state of the vulnerable systems,
inconsistencies in them require manual effort. We conducted a man-
ual investigation and then utilized the efforts to build an automated
system to identify inconsistencies. For others, we built automated
tools that can be used to recover consistency.
While the estimated disclosure date in this study fundamentally
questions the completeness of the NVD, other fixes address NVD’s
inconsistency. It is argued that the reports listed in the reference
links in NVD might not be public or known at the time of their
insertion into the NVD. In addition, the vulnerability information
can be modified multiple times, as it is the practice with incremental
vulnerability reporting. The proposed approach can therefore be
utilized to change the estimated disclosure date of the vulnerability
during a modification, given such practices and operational caveats.
Root Cause of Inconsistencies. Understanding the root causes
of the inconsistencies in NVD can help eliminating them. Our anal-
yses provide various plausible explanations for the root causes of
inconsistencies. For vendor/product inconsistencies, we noticed
that they were clearly due to the incorrect naming conventions,
using developers as vendors, due to vendor acquisitions, and ty-
pos by analysts. Among those root causes, the acquisitions are a
dynamic root cause, and therefore are difficult to mitigate, while
other causes can be addressed by standardizing a nomenclature.
The reason behind the inconsistencies in the v3 severity is the
adoption of a new severity scoring system, which was not in ex-
istence at the time of scoring the severity of older vulnerabilities.
Given the absence of the parameters that differentiate between v3
and v2, v3 was not generalized for those vulnerabilities, although
such generalization was done by NVD when adopting v2 through-
out with a considerable accuracy. Similarly, by leveraging the deep
learning-based algorithms, we determined the v3 labels from the v2
labels. We investigated the severity of the vulnerabilities with a lag
between the estimated disclosure date and the NVD date. Figure 4
shows the average lag, in days, by the different severity levels in
the v3, and we observe that the average among the various severity
levels ranges between 47.6 days to 66.8 days, thereby demonstrating
that the delay in the insertion of vulnerability into the NVD has no
relationship with the severity of the vulnerability.
Applications. This work highlights inconsistencies in the NVD
data fields, and proposes methods to fix them. The diversified incon-
sistencies warrant multiple tools, dealing with one at a time. As a
result, this study can be utilized by the analysts at NVD towards the
following goals: (1) The estimated disclosure date identification can
enrich the vulnerability report for the end-user’s perusal. The tool
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Figure 4: Average lag time by v3 severity level.
enables the analysts to scrape through the different vulnerability
reports and disclosures from the reference links of the recently
added vulnerabilities and notify them of the disclosure date. (2) The
vendor and product inconsistency finding tool can be leveraged
during the vulnerability reporting. The individual reporters can en-
ter the vendor and product name according to their perception, and
the tool will suggest the suitable vendor and product name from
the generated consistent database. The reporter will then choose
the consistent vendor and product name if available. Additionally,
the NVD analysts can use the tool to re-assess the vendor and prod-
uct names towards the generation of CPE URI (both 2.2 and 2.3).
Moreover, for new vendor and/or product names, our observed
inconsistencies and the root causes can help control the inconsis-
tencies in the future (see Appendix A.3 for details). (3) Our tool
to determine the CVSS v3 metrics can be leveraged for a uniform
severity metric across vulnerabilities in the database. Moreover, it
can be used by the users of NVD to prioritize their patching.
Leveraging the improved NVD, we formulate analysis questions
as case studies to understand the impact of our corrective measures.
Although there were numerous analyses that we came up with,
we present the questions that a user might have when using the
corrected fields. We observe that while public disclosures happen
in the early days of the week, the inclusion of them in the NVD
happens on the latter days. Additionally, the high reportage of CVEs
on the last day of a year can be due to their retroactive inclusion
when only the year was known. The temporal analysis of software
weakness can help understand the trends to understand the up and
the coming vulnerabilities. These emerging software weaknesses
may be a result of a recently found attack vector. These can be
utilized during the software product development and can help
prioritize patching processes, and to emphasize upon, during the
various phases of the software development life cycle. A consis-
tent database would give a better picture of the trends, including
their exploitation window (depending upon the disclosure date of
a vulnerability and the date it is discovered on a host computer).
Limitations. To estimate the disclosure date, we consider the do-
main names representing 85% of the URLs. The reduction of cover-
age by 15% may lead to an imprecise estimation of the disclosure
date. Moreover, vendor and product inconsistency numbers present
a lower bound on inconsistencies that NVD may have. We would
not group the vendors if another vendor acquired a probable incon-
sistent vendor. An approach to improve the bounds would require
determining the date of acquisition of the probable inconsistent
vendor and then correlating it with their estimated disclosure date.
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7 CONCLUSION
Given the importance of such a database as NVD for security op-
erations, identifying, measuring, and fixing the inconsistencies is
essential, which we pursue through various tools, including multi-
sourcedweb scraping, manual vetting, and deep learning algorithms
for the publication date, vendor names, product names, severity
categories, and vulnerability types inconsistency remedies. The
inconsistency fixed database revealed exciting insights about the
NVD and vulnerability reporting in general, and how basing the
analysis on the current NVD leads to different conclusions than
on the fixed one. The frequent days in estimated public disclosure
and published date shows the prevalence of early days in the week
(Monday and Tuesday) among disclosure dates and the latter days
among publication date in the NVD. The fixed vendor names show
decreasing inconsistencies over time, while product names need
more attention for better resolution. The v3 fix reveals a better
distribution of the v3 metric and the vulnerability type fix identifies
additional types, other than the ones listed in the NVD.
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A APPENDIX
A.1 Feature Pattern
Vulnerabilities switch severity labels across versions due to the in-
troduction of new parameters as well as the use of different weights
to existing parameters. Given that v2 and v3 capture behavioral
aspects of vulnerabilities, we investigated if the added parameters
in v3 depend on the v2 metrics. To enrich the investigation for this
extrapolation, we also used the vulnerability type information of
every vulnerability. Then, we explored the patterns within a v2
label that lead to a change in severity. To visualize the patterns, we
began by applying the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) as a
feature reduction technique. PCA is a linear dimensionality reduc-
tion technique using the Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) of
the data to project it to a lower-dimensional space [43], reducing the
13-dimensional feature vector to a three-dimension space. Figure 5
shows the features in a 3D space. We utilize the 3-D representation
because the 2-D representation had overlapping severity labels,
thereby making it difficult to distinguish the different patterns. For
example, the figure shows the different v3 labels a High (v2) severity
vulnerability has moved to. While the vulnerabilities in v2 Low are
scattered in the space, High and Medium in v2 have followed spe-
cific and clear patterns. This means that vulnerabilities with Low
v2 severity scores were the most affected by the v3 transformation.
These patterns indicate that the added parameters in the v3 severity
calculation can be extrapolated from the existing v2 parameters.
Moreover, the scattered distribution of vulnerabilities with Low
severity in v2 highlights the fundamental changes applied in v3.
Table 13: Ground truth - prediction results
HHHHHv2
v3 L M H C
# % # % # % # %
L 3 0.08 3823 98.76 45 1.16 0 0.00
M 0 0.00 9724 42.77 13010 57.23 0 0.00
H 0 0.00 320 2.87 5438 48.70 5409 48.43
A.2 Prediction Performance
In table 4, we observed that the movement of v2 vulnerabilities
with High severity level is ≈equally split between High and Critical
severity levels when transformed to v3. However, the prediction
results of the vulnerabilities with no v3 severity in table 6 shows
that the split of v2 vulnerabilities with High severity that transform
to critical severity level is ≈twice the number of vulnerabilities that
transform to High severity in v3. To ensure the performance of
our prediction, we check the behavior of the model for the ground
truth dataset. We begin by using our model to predict for the vul-
nerabilities that have v3 labeled. Table 13 shows the results of this
experiment. Recall from Table 4 that only 1% of v2-medium and
9.5% v2-low vulnerabilities transformed to low severity level in v3.
We, therefore, see less number of vulnerabilities in the v3 low sever-
ity level. Considering that this experiment includes the training
dataset, which makes 80% of our overall dataset, we now look into
only the testing dataset, removing possible biases. Table 14 shows
the actual representation of the ground truth-testing dataset, while
table 15 shows the movements of the same vulnerabilities by our
prediction model. Notice that low severity vulnerabilities in v2 are
Table 14: Test dataset - ground truth data
HHHHHv2
v3 L M H C
# % # % # % # %
L 104 13.42 644 83.10 27 3.48 0 0.00
M 84 1.85 2,368 52.08 1,974 43.41 121 2.66
H 0 0.00 85 3.80 950 42.52 1,199 53.67
only 10% of the total testing dataset, out of which, only 1.38% of the
samples remain in low in v3, leading to most of the low vulnerabili-
ties in v2 moving to medium severity level in v3. Observe that in
the tables, 13, and 15, we see that the v2-high vulnerabilities have
proportionally transformed to v3-high and v3-critical. Considering
these the only explanation for the presence of ≈twice the number of
transformed v3-critical vulnerabilities than v3-high (from v2-high)
is the nature of their feature space than possible aberration in our
model.
Table 15: Test dataset - prediction results
HHHHHv2
v3 L M H C
# % # % # % # %
L 6 0.77 765 98.71 4 0.52 0 0.00
M 0 0.00 2128 46.80 2419 53.20 0 0.00
H 0 0.00 58 2.6 933 47.76 1243 55.64
A.3 Impact: Vendor and Product Consistency
Recall that in section 4.2, we identify, quantify, and remedy the
inconsistencies in vendor and product names in NVD. The vulner-
abilities corresponding to the inconsistent vendor names are as-
signed to the consistent vendors (identified by vulnerability count).
What type of vulnerabilities are impacted by such inconsistencies?
Are they unimportant so that they can be considered as those that
may not have much impact on host systems and can thus be ig-
nored? To answer these questions, we consider the vulnerabilities
that have inconsistent vendor or product names. Among those that
are corresponding to well-known vendors, we select 10 CVEs ran-
domly, shown in Table 16. To evaluate their impact, we focus on
their severity and vulnerability type. Notice that all except one
(CVE-2006-6601) are of High severity (v2). This CVE-2006-6601 vul-
nerability is in windows media player though of Medium severity,
which can be exploited by a crafted header of .MID (MIDI) file to
and cause a DoS attack. Among the other nine vulnerabilities, four
can be exploited remotely. Additionally, CVE-2018-16983, a vulner-
ability in tor browser, can be exploited by an attacker to bypass by
using text/html;/json Content-Type, which can pose to be a privacy
risk.
These analyses show that the vulnerabilities corresponding to the
inconsistent vendor names are impacting, severe, and thus cannot
be ignored. Additionally, it exhibits the importance of having a
consistent vendor/product name.
A.4 Observations: Inconsistent Vendor and
Product
From our analysis, we observed several interesting naming pat-
terns that reflect the complex software ecosystem and highlight
difficulties that can arise in managing vendor and product names.
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Figure 5: Vulnerabilities from Low, High, and Medium severity in CVSS v2 that transformed into different severity levels in v3. A non-linear
pattern can be observed among the vulnerabilities that were assigned respective v3 severity.
Table 16: Case study: A sample of vulnerabilities corresponding
to known vendors. These vendors were mislabelled, meaning that
they have another instance of its own. For example, the dominant
instance of microsft is microsoft. We uniform the dominant instance
as the consistent vendor name. Most of these vulnerabilities give
remote access to the adversary.
CVEs Vendor Severity (v2) Description
CVE-2017-7689 schneider_electric High Command injection
CVE-2006-6601 windows Medium Malformed header (DoS)
CVE-2008-4019 microsft High Remote code execution
CVE-2008-3471 microsft High Remote code execution
CVE-2014-0754 chneider_electric High Directory traversal
CVE-2009-1185 kernel High Privilege escalation
CVE-2018-16983 torproject High Bypass script blocking
CVE-2008-0166 openssl_project High Crypto keys-based attack
CVE-2017-5005 quick_heal High Remote code execution
CVE-2017-8774 quick_heal High Memory corruption
For example: 1 In the NVD, various entities may be deemed the
vendor. Interestingly, a primary software developer is sometimes
listed as a vendor, and different maintainers over time may list the
same product. For example, Igor Sysoev was the original author of
nginx, which is now maintained by nginx.inc, and both of them are
listed as vendors with nginx as a product. Additionally, developers
can be referenced with variations of their real name, leading to
inconsistency (e.g., provos and neilsprovos). Acquired companies
can also be listed as products under the acquiring vendor (e.g., ICQ
and AOL). Note that our vendor heuristics allow us to select these
vendor pairs for manual analysis. 2 A vendor could be a parent
company while the product is the subsidiary. Here, the subsidiary
can be both a vendor (listing its own software) as well as a product,
which is also detected by our vendor heuristics. 3 A vendor could
change name (e.g., cat became quickheal). We note that our vendor
heuristics may catch this if the old and new vendor names share
characters or product names, but may miss cases otherwise.
Thus, the NVD would benefit from defining consistent rules for
vendor and product naming, such as on the use of white spaces,
special characters, and abbreviations. One path forward would be
to require vulnerability reporters to check their name submissions
against a tool or online interface that searches existing names that
likely match, perhaps using an approach such as our identification
method.
